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THE MATHEMATICS OF CUMULATIVE
VOTING
LEWIS R. MILLs*
The crucial tactical problem confronting each faction in a -cumu-
lative voting contest is how to cumulate their votes so as to elect
the maximum number of directors possible. It was in order to
provide "a simplified and workable system of solving" this problem
that Arthur T. Cole in 1950 published his article on the "Legal
and Mathematical Aspects of Cumulative Voting." The equations
presented -by Cole have since become the accepted formulae for
solving the mathematical problems of cumulative voting. In this
article, the author demonstrates, however, that Cole's equations
contain significant errors and may yield faulty results in some
situations. He then sets forth a more rigorous and accurate ap-
proach to the mathematical problems involved in cumulative
voting for the election of corporate directors.
ARTHUR T. COLE, JR., published his article on "Legal and
IMathematical Aspects of Cumulative Voting" in 1950.1 Since
then it has been one of the standard references in discussions of
* A.B. 1951, Brown University; LL.B. 1954, Washington University; S.J.D. 1956, Uni-
versity of Wisconsin. Associate Professor of Law, Washington University.
'2 S.C.L.Q. 225 (1950). The concept of cumulative voting in the election of corpo-
rate directors was first articulated in a provision of the Illinois state constitution
adopted in 1870. ILL. CONST. art. XI, § 3; see C. WLUAMS, CUMULATIVE VOTING FOR
DiREaroas 20-25 (1951); Campbell, The Origin and Growth of Cumulative Voting for
Directors, Bus. LAwYER, Apr., 1955, at 3-6; Sell & Fuge, Impact of Classified Directorates
on the Constitutional Right of Cumulative Voting, 17 U. Prr. L. REv. 151, 153-56
(1956); Stephan, Cumulative Voting and Classified Boards: Some Reflections on Wolfson
v. Avery, 31 NoTRE DAIm LAW. 351, 351-53 (1955). Despite the novelty of the idea, it
spread rapidly throughout the states, and today cumulative voting in corporate elec-
tions is mandatory in many states and permissive in many others. See ABA-ALI
MODEL Bus. CoRp. Acr ANN. § 31, at 4 (1960).
Cumulative voting is designed to provide a means by which minority shareholders
of a corporation can achieve representation on the board of directors commensurate
with their capital interest. Under straight voting, the other common method of elect-
ing directors, each shareholder votes the number of shares he owns for each director
candidate. It is obvious that, voting in this manner, a mere majority of the share-
holders of a corporation can elect all the directors, and the minority can elect none.
However, under cumulative voting each shareholder has as many votes as he has
shares multiplied by the number of directors to be elected, and may either concentrate
all his votes on a single candidate or distribute them among several candidates as he
sees fit. By utilizing the cumulative voting method and distributing their votes
properly, minority shareholders of a corporation are able to attain representation on
the board of directors roughly proportionate to the number of shares they own.
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cumulative voting;2 certainly, his treatment of the mathematical
aspect of cumulative voting is the most ambitious in the literature.3
Unfortunately, most of the equations presented by Cole contain
errors. In some instances, these errors are minor; as demonstrated
below, some of his equations yield valid results except in cases in
which fractional shares are permitted to vote.4 Others, however,
contain more serious errors. This article demonstrates Cole's mathe-
matical errors, and then presents a more rigorous mathematical
analysis of the problem and considers some problems relating to tied
elections.
COLE'S ERRORS
The first problem with which Cole deals concerns a hypothetical
corporate election in which all of the outstanding shares are split
between two rival factions. Let us refer to one faction as the red
faction, to the other as the blue faction, and define the following
symbols:5
r = the number of shares to be voted by the red faction.
t = the total number of shares outstanding.
See generally C. WILLUAms, supra at 6; Sell & Fuge, supra at 151-52; Stephan, supra at
353-54.
'See, e.g., E. ARANow & H. EINsoRN, PROXY CONTESTS FOR CORPORATE CONTROL 296
n.l (1957); A. FRAY, C. MoRIus & J. CHOPER, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CORPORATIONS 308
(1966); H. HENN, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF CORPORATIONS AND OTHER BUSINESS ENTER-
PRIsES 293 n.11 (1961); N. LATTIN & R. JENNINGS, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CORPORATIONS
584 (3d ed. 1959); R. STEVENS & H. HENN, STATUTES, CASES, AND MATERIALS ON THE LAW
OF CORPORATIONS AND OTHER BUSINESS ENTERPRISES 557 n.15 (1965); ABA-ALI MODEL
Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. § 81, at 4-5 (1960).
1 Other discussions of the mathematical aspects appear in C. WILLIAMS, Supra
note 1, at 40-42; and Gerstenberg, The Mathematics of Cumulative Voting, 9 J. Ac-
COUNTANCY 117 (1910). The only equation given by Williams is the same as Cole's
first equation and is subject to the same infirmities. See text accompanying note 7
infra. All of Gerstenberg's equations are given by Cole and, indeed, as Cole acknowl-
edges, most of his mathematics are based on Gerstenberg's article. Cole, supra note
1, at 229 n.17. Gerstenberg recognizes that the underlying mathematical relation is an
inequality rather than an equation. However, he fails to develop this point. See text
accompanying note 7 infra.
' See ABA-ALI MODEL Bus. CORP. ACr ANN. § 22 (1960), and comparable statutes
described in paragraph 2 therein, for examples of statutes expressly permitting frac-
tional shares to vote.
'Cole uses different symbols and designates the red faction as the minority. Cole's
notation is:
x -the number of shares to be voted by the minority [red] faction [r]
a = the total number of shares outstanding [t]
b =the total number of directors to be elected [T]
c = the number of directors to be elected by the minority [red] faction [R]. Cole,
supra note 1, at 230.
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R - the number of directors that the red faction can elect even
if the blue faction makes optimal use of its votes.
T - the total number of directors to be elected.
To determine how many shares the red faction must control to
elect R directors Cole prescribes the following equation:
tR
r= T±-1 +-1
This equation produces accurate results only if there are no frac-
tional shares with voting rights. To illustrate the effect of fractional
share voting, let us suppose that the corporation has 100 shares out-
standing, a five member board of directors, and the red faction wants
to elect two directors. Cole's equation becomes:
100x2
r= + =34%
Without mathematical explanation, Cole tells us to drop the frac-
tion.6 Used in this manner, his equation indicates that the red
faction needs to control 34 shares to elect two directors. But if there
are half shares that are permitted to vote, the red faction could elect
two directors if it controlled only 33/2 shares. In such a case it
would have 1671 votes; it could cast 84 votes for one candidate and
83V2 votes for the other. If the blue faction split its 332/2 votes
among four candidates, three of them would receive 83 votes each,
and the fourth would receive 83V votes. Consequently, both of
the red faction's candidates would be elected. And, of course,
if the blue faction voted for only three candidates, both of the red
faction's candidates would be elected.
The basic error in Cole's approach is that he attempts to express
as an equation a mathematical relation that is an inequality.7 As a
result, his equation may yield inaccurate results if fractional shares
vote, and it cannot be solved algebraically to produce valid equations
for the other quantities, such as R or T.
Cole's second equation is an application of his first to the special
case in which the red faction wants to elect all the directors. Mathe-
6 Cole, supra note 1, at 230 & n.19, 233, 238 n.31.
7 See text accompanying note 13 infra.
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matically, this means that R = T. Substituting T for R in his first
equation, Cole gives his second equation as:
tT
Similarly, Cole's third equation is an application of his first equa-
tion to the special case in which the red faction wants to elect only
one director. This means that R = 1. Substituting 1 for R in his
first equation, Cole gives his third equation as:
Both of these equations are subject to the same infirmities as the first.
Cole's fourth equation mathematically is a trivial variation of
his third. He simply substracts "I" from the right side of his third
equation to produce his fourth. He offers the fourth as a means of
determining how many shares the red faction could control without
being able to elect any directors:
t
r--T-+I
This produces an accurate equation, but in some cases it is accurate
in a very literal and somewhat surprising way. Suppose a corpora-
tion has a nine member board of directors and 100 shares outstand-
ing, of which the red faction controls 10 shares. According to Cole's
fourth equation, the red faction should be unable to elect any direc-
tors. What happens at an election? The red faction casts 90 votes
for its candidate. The blue faction has 90 shares, resulting in 810
votes. If it votes for more than nine candidates, one of them will
receive less than 90 votes and the red candidate will be elected. If it
votes for exactly nine candidates, it can give each of them exactly
90 votes; in this event the election would be tied and no one would
be elected. On these facts the blue faction prevents the red candi-
date's election only at a cost of not electing any blue candidates.
In some jurisdictions, this could lead to liquidation of the corpora-
tion.8
8 See ABA-ALI MoDiEL Bus. Coai. Acr ANN. § 90(a)(3) (1960), and comparable
statutes decribed in paragraph 2 therein, for examples of statutes permitting liquidation
when shareholders are "deadlocked" and cannot elect directors. The inequality
-< t should be used in lieu of Cole's fourth equation. Values of r that satisfy
T4.1
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In all cases in which the voting of fractional shares is not involved,
Cole's first three equations yield valid results. In one sense, then,
the error in those equations is quite minor.9 But in another sense
it is not. The small error in Cole's first equation may be magnified
if that equation is manipulated algebraically to produce equations
for other quantities. For example, if his first equation is solved for
R-the method by which he derived his fifth equation-the error
becomes more serious. His fifth equation is:
R= (r- 1) (T + 1)
t
This equation, supposedly, tells the red faction how many directors
it can elect if it controls r shares. Suppose a corporation has 1,000
shares outstanding and has an eight member board of directors.
If the red faction controls 334 shares, how many directors can it
elect? Cole's fifth equation gives:
R = (334 -- 1) (8 +[ 1) = 2 97
1,000 1,000
Because Cole tells us to drop the fraction,10 the red faction can elect
only two directors-according to Cole.
But Cole is wrong. With 334 shares the red faction has 2,672
votes; it can cast 891 votes for each of two candidates and 890 votes
for a third. The blue faction has 666 shares or 5,328 votes. If it
spreads its votes over six candidates it can give only 888 votes to
each. All three of the red faction's candidates will be elected.
Cole's sixth equation purports to apply to a slightly different
factual situation. Suppose some outstanding shares are not yet
committed to either the red or the blue faction. If the blue faction
controls b shares, how many shares must the red faction control to
elect R directors? Assume that the red faction can acquire the neces-
sary amount of the uncommitted shares. Cole's sixth equation states:
Rb+T+ 1
r=T-R+1
Cole's own example demonstrates the inaccuracy of this equation.
He hypothesizes a corporation with 500 shares outstanding, most
this inequality are red shareholdings that do not prevent the election of all directors
by the blue faction.
OBut see statutes cited note 4 supra.
10 Cole, supra note 1, at 230 n.19, 233, 238 n.31.
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of which are held by disinterested shareholders. It has a seven mem-
ber board of directors. If the blue faction controls 57 shares, how
many of the other shares would the red faction have to control to
elect four directors? Cole says:
4x57 + 7 + 1 228+8 236
r- = 7-4+1 = 8-4 - 4
"According to this finding, the minority [red] faction would have to
control 59 shares in order to elect four out of seven directors.I
' l
It should be obvious (even without algebraic expressions) that
if the red faction has 58 shares and the blue faction has only 57
shares, the red faction can elect the fourth director. The red faction
with 58 shares would have 406 votes. It can give 101 votes to each
of two candidates and 102 votes to each of two other candidates.
The blue faction with 57 shares has only 399 votes. It can give 100
votes to each of three candidates and 99 to a fourth. Contrary to the
result obtained from Cole's sixth equation, the red faction can elect
four directors with only 58 shares.
Cole's seventh equation is an application of his sixth to the special
case in which the red faction wants to elect all the directors. Mathe-
matically, this means that R = T. Surprisingly, Cole's seventh equa-
tion cannot be obtained by substituting T for R in his sixth. His
seventh equation is:
r = bT + 1
Similarly, Cole's eighth equation is an application of his sixth
to the special case in which the red faction wants to elect one direc-




Both the seventh and eighth equations can produce erroneous
results if fractional shares vote. Neither can be manipulated to
produce valid equations for other quantities.
Cole's ninth equation is a mathematically trivial variation of his
eighth, similar to the variation on his third by his fourth. His equa-
tion gives the number of shares that the red faction can control with-
"I Id. at 235.
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out electing a director and is literally accurate in the same way that
his fourth equation was. His ninth equation states:
b
r
Cole's tenth equation is the same as his fifth equation except that
(r + b) is substituted for t:
R= -_(r - 1) (T + 1)
r+b
The substitution is necessary because his tenth equation is meant to
apply to cases in which not all of the outstanding shares are voted.
However, the substitution does nothing to cure the basic defects in
the fifth equation; consequently, the tenth equation suffers from
those same defects. Cole's eleventh and twelfth equations deal with
a factually different problem. 12
12 Cole's eleventh and twelfth equations attempt to deal with a more complex
situation than do his first ten. They are meant to apply when there is a third faction,
which we will call the yellow faction. His eleventh equation says that the yellow fac-
tion can elect one director if
r I
y =--T- + ---
where y is the number of shares controlled by the yellow faction. Id. at 237-39. In
using his eleventh equation, Cole does not drop fractions; on the contrary, he treats
them as whole numbers. Id. at 238 n.31. This cavalier approach to fractions makes the
results -obtained valid in all cases in which fractional shares do not vote. A mathe-
matically more precise expression (and one that holds even if fractional shares vote) is:
Y>r
This expression simply states algebraically that the yellow faction can elect one director
only if it has more shares per candidate than the red faction.
Cole's twelfth equation builds on his eleventh equation and deals with an improbable
situation. See id. at 239-40. If the red faction knows that the blue faction controls b
shares, and further knows that the yellow faction will buy enough uncommitted shares
to elect one director, how many shares must the red faction control to elect R directors?
Cole's twelfth equation states:
bR
If fractions are dropped, this equation gives valid results in cases in which fractional
shares do not vote. However, Cole specifically says that in using this equation, fractions
are to be treated as whole numbers. Id. at 239 n.33. If this direction is followed, the
equation yields a value of r that is one share too high, except when bR is an exact
multiple of (T - R).
For example, suppose the blue faction controls 50 shares and the red faction wants
[Vol. 1968: 28
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A MORE RIGOROUS APPROACH
We can replace Cole's spurious equations with more precise ex-
pressions. His first group of equations deal with cases in which all
of the outstanding shares will be voted by one faction or the other.
In such a case, the red faction has rT votes to distribute among R
rT
candidates, or r- votes per candidate. Since all of the shares are
controlled by either the red faction or the blue faction, the blue
faction has t - r shares and (t - r)T votes. Among how many can-
didates will the blue faction distribute its votes? If the blue faction
votes for only T - R candidates, there is no contest; all candidates,
both red and blue, are elected. Consequently we are interested only
in what would happen if the blue faction votes for more than T - R
candidates. But because the number of blue candidates is the de-
nominator of the blue group's votes per candidate, the lower the
number of blue candidates is, the higher their votes per candidate
will be. Therefore, in order to maximize their votes per candidates
in a contested election, the blue faction must vote for (T - R + 1)
candidates. Voting for less than this number would concede the elec-
tion of R directors by the red faction; voting for more would decrease
to elect five directors of a nine member board. How many shares does it need? Cole's
equation gives
50 x 5
r= 5 +1=62 +A 1=63
Cole would say this result means the red faction needs 64 shares. Suppose the red fac-
tion has only 63 shares; what happens at the election?
The red faction has 567 votes, it casts 113 votes for each of three candidates and 114
votes for each of two more. The blue faction has 450 votes, it casts 112 votes for each
of two candidates and 113 votes for each of two more. No matter how many votes the
yellow faction casts for its single candidate, none of the red candidates lose. The loser
is one of the blue candidates.
The correct expression is derived as follows: Since the yellow faction is going to
defeat somebody's candidate, the expression must be designed to make sure that the
candidate displaced by the yellow faction is a blue candidate rather than a red one.





This simplifies to: r > T - R
Here again Cole's equation defines a sufficient condition to achieve the desired
result, but not a necessary condition.
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their votes per candidate. For this reason we can express the num-(t -r)T
ber of votes per blue candidate as t - R+T- Rn + I
For the red faction to elect its R candidates, its votes per candi-
date must be higher than the blue faction's votes per candidate. We
can express this algebraically as:
rT (t - r)T
K- T-R+ 1
This inequality can be solved for r in the following manner: multi-
plying both sides by R (T - R + 1) gives:
rT 2 - rRT + rT > RTt- rRT
Adding rRT to both sides and dividing both sides by T further sim-
plifies it to:
r(T+ 1)>tR
Solving for r yields:
tR
r > T +l (1)
This expression means that in order to elect R directors, the red
faction must control a number of voting shares more than (even
if only fractionally more than) the quantity on the right side of
the inequality. This expression is similar to but more precise than
Cole's first equation.13
Moreover, this inequality can be manipulated algebraically with-




This expression can be used to determine how many directors the
red faction can elect if it controls r shares. Because R is necessarily
a whole number (we can have fractional shares but not fractional
23 When Cole's equation is satisfied, this inequality is also satisfied. However, there
are cases in which the inequality is satisfied but Cole's equation is not. In mathe-
matical terms, the satisfaction of Cole's equation is a sufficient condition for the satis-
faction of the inequality, but it is not a necessary condition.
11 An expression comparable to Cole's second equation can be obtained by substi-
tuting T for R in inequality (1). Similarly, an expression comparable to his third
equation can be obtained by substituting 1 for R in inequality (1).
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directors), the red faction can elect the largest whole number of
directors that is smaller than the quantity on the right side of the
inequality. For example, if there are 1000 shares outstanding of
which the red faction controls 334, and an eight member board
of directors, the right side of the inequality is 34 (8+1) 3.006.1,000 or.06
The largest whole number that is smaller than this quantity is, of
course, three; that is the number of directors that the red faction can
elect on these facts.
Inequality (1) can also be solved for T:
tR
r (3)
If the red faction has enough power to change the size of the board
of directors, it can use this expression to determine how many direc-
tors there should be to permit it to elect R directors with r shares.
Suppose the corporation has 1,000 shares outstanding. If the red
faction controls 600 shares and wants to elect seven directors, what
size should the board of directors be? This inequality indicates that
1000 x 7600 1
The value of the right side is 10%; therefore, because inequality
(3) requires that T must be larger than this amount, if the red
faction sets the size of the board of directors at eleven, it can elect
seven directors with 600 shares.
Cole's sixth equation failed to tell us accurately how many shares
the red faction would need to elect R directors, if there are un-
committed shares and the blue faction controls b shares. The cor-
rect mathematical approach to this problem is similar to that by
rT
which we derived inequality (1). The red faction can cast-R--
votes for each of its R candidates. If the red candidates are to be
elected, this quantity must be larger than the number of votes the
blue faction can cast for T - R + 1 candidates. This condition can
be stated algebraically as:
rT bT
"E > T-R 1
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If we divide both sides by T and multiply both sides by R, this
becomes:
bR
r > T - R + 1 (4)
Applying this expression to Cole's hypothetical case gives
57x4
r> 7 -- 4+ 1 -=57
This means that the red faction must control a number of shares
larger than 57 in order to elect four directors. If no fractional shares
are permitted to vote, the smallest number larger than 57 is 58,
and as we saw above, 58 shares are sufficient to elect four directors.
Of course, if there were fractional shares voting, fifty-seven and a
fraction shares would also be sufficient.
Cole's tenth equation is meant to be used to determine how many
directors the red faction can elect with r shares if the blue faction
controls b shares and some of the outstanding shares do not vote.
Because the non-voting shares do not affect the outcome, a correct
expression for this problem can be obtained by substituting r + b
for t in inequality (2):
R<r(T+ 1)
r+b (5)
This expression is a more general form of inequality (2) and can, of
course, be used whether or not some outstanding shares do not vote.
In applying this inequality the red faction should divide its rT votes
among R candidates in amounts as nearly equal as possible.
TIED ELECTIONS
Tied elections are troublesome, both mathematically and legally.
Under cumulative voting ties can occur in two different ways. In
the first type of tie, more candidates than there are directors to be
elected each receive an equal number of votes, and no candidate
receives more than that number of votes. For example, suppose
the red faction controls 52 shares, the blue faction controls 156
shares, and the board of directors has seven members. The red
faction can give 182 votes to each of two candidates; the blue fac-
tion can give 182 votes to each of six candidates; in this event, each
of eight candidates for the seven-member board receives the same
[Vol. 1968:28
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number of votes. In ties of this type none of the candidates are
elected; it seems likely that the preceding board remains in office.
In some jurisdictions, at least, a continued deadlock of this type is
grounds for liquidation of the corporation.15
In the second type of tie, some number of candidates less than
the number of directors to be elected receive more votes than the
remaining candidates. Of the remaining candidates, enough receive
an equal number of votes so that the total of (i) those receiving the
same number of votes, and (ii) those receiving more than that num-
ber of votes, exceeds the number of directors to be elected. For
example, suppose the red faction controls 53 shares, the blue faction
controls 159 shares, and the board of directors has seven members.
The red faction can give 186 votes to one candidate and 185 votes
to another. The blue faction can give 186 votes to each of three
candidates and 185 votes to each of three more.
In ties of this second type it seems clear that some directors are
elected. In the example just given, for instance, one red and three
blue directors are elected. However, there appears to be no way
to determine which four members of the preceding board they dis-
place. It should follow that all members of the preceding board are
displaced, leaving three vacant seats on the new board. To fill the
remaining seats, perhaps there should be a run-off election among
the tied candidates-an election in which all shareholders (including
those who voted for the admittedly elected directors) would be per-
mitted to vote.16 Or perhaps, in some jurisdictions, the newly
elected directors should select the persons to fill the vacant seats.",
In the example just given, a run-off election should result in a
deadlock-a tie of the first type. Each candidate would receive 371
votes.' In both examples of ties given above: (i) both the red and
the blue factions voted for one more candidate than inequality (5)
indicated they could elect;' 9 and (ii) the following equation (in
Ir See note 8 supra.
20 See State ex rel. Price v. Du Brul, 100 Ohio St. 272, 126 N.E. 87 (1919).1 7 See ABA-ALI MODEL Bus. Coln'. Acr ANN. § 36 (1960), and comparable statutes
described in paragraph 2 therein, for examples of statutes permitting directors in office
to fill "vacancies" on the board of directors. Quaere whether such statutes are appli-
cable to ties of the second type.
18 Conceivably the applicable cumulative voting provision could be interpreted to
require multiplication of the number of shares by the seats remaining to be filled rather
than by the total number of directors to be elected at the election, in which case each
candidate would receive 159 votes.
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Whenever these two conditions are met, a tie of either the first or
second type occurs; if it is a tie of the second type it cannot be
resolved by run-off elections. The possibility of ties occurring under
these conditions does not impair the literal accuracy of the inequali-
ties. It does, however, indicate the existence of an alternate strategy;
by voting for R + 1 candidates under these conditions, the red
faction forces the blue faction to choose between (i) a tied election,
or (ii) permitting the red faction to elect R + 1 directors.
If fractional votes are not permitted, a tie of the second type can
occur in some cases even if the red faction votes for only that number
of candidates that inequality (5) indicates it can elect.21 For ex-
"o The designation of one faction as the red faction is, of course, wholly arbitrary.
For this reason the "blue" faction cannot determine how many directors it can elect
by calculating R from inequality (5) and then subtracting R from T. Rather, it must
calculate B, the number of directors it can elect, from its own version of inequality(5):
B< b(T+1)
b+r
2' This occurs whenever the right side of inequality (5) is an integer.
"The author developed a computer program to determine, for values of T up to
30, those instances in which ties of the second type could occur even if one faction
voted as indicated by inequality (5). This program was executed for the author by the
Washington University Computing Facilities through National Science Foundation
Grant G-22296; this assistance is gratefully acknowledged. The results for values of T
through 11 are shown in the following table:
T R r b R' B1
7 5 5n+2 3n+1 4 1
7 3 3n + 2 5n+3 2 1
10 8 8n + 3 Sn + 1 6 1
10 3 3n + 2 8n + 5 2 2
10 4 4n + 3 7n + 5 2 1
11 7 7n + 3 5n + 2 5 2
11 5 5n + 3 7n +4 3 2
In this table R' is the number of red directors elected on the first ballot and B' is the
number of blue directors elected on the first ballot. In determining the values of r
(the number of shares controlled by the red faction), n can assume the value of any
integer, but it must have the same value in determining the corresponding value of b
(the number of shares controlled by the blue faction).
Some discussion of the use of this table may be helpful. Ties that affect red candi-
dates can occur when the red faction votes as indicated by inequality (5) only if the
size of the board of directors appears in the table as a possible value of T. For example,
such ties do not occur with five member boards of directors because 5 does not appear
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ample, suppose the red faction controls 53 shares, the blue faction
controls 88 shares, and the board of directors has seven members.
Inequality (5) indicates that the red faction can elect three directors.
At an election the red faction can give 124 votes to each of two
candidates and 123 votes to another. Although inequality (5) indi-
cates that the blue faction can elect only four directors, it could
give 124 votes to one candidate and 123 votes to each of four others.
This would give rise to a tie of the second type in which two red
and one blue director would be elected.
The possibility of such ties impairs the validity of the inequali-
ties, although only to a limited extent. If run-off elections are used
to fill the seats remaining vacant after the first ballot, the red faction
will in all cases elect a total of at least R directors.22 When this tie-
in the table as a value of T. Each of the next three columns of the table imposes
additional conditions on the occurrence of such ties. For example, let us see how the
table is used to determine whether such a tie will occur in a specific case. Suppose the
red faction controls 35 shares, the blue faction controls 57 shares, and the board of
directors has seven members. Seven appears in the table as a value of T, so the
possibility of the tie cannot be eliminated at this first stage of the analysis. Next, the
value of R is calculated from inequality (5). If the result is other than 5 or 3 the tie
cannot occur, because these are the only values of R in the table when T equals 7.
In our hypothetical case, inequality (5) indicates that the red faction can elect three
directors, so the possibility of a tie cannot be eliminated at the second stage of the
analysis. The only value of r in the table when T equals 7 and R equals 3 is 3n + 2,
i.e., when r is divided by 3 it leaves a remainder of 2. This condition is also met in
the hypothetical case; 35 divided by 3 yields a quotient of 11 and a remainder of 2, so
the possibility of the tie cannot be eliminated at the third stage. If, however, the red
faction controlled 36 or 37 shares instead of 35, the tie could not occur; those quantities
do not leave remainders of 2 when divided by 3. The next column of the table gives
a value of b of 5n + 3. At this stage, however, the value of n has been fixed as 11, the
quotient produced by dividing r by 3. This means that the tie will occur if and
only if b equals 58 (5 x 11 + 3). Since in the hypothetical case b is equal to 57, we
conclude that a tie does not occur if the red faction votes as indicated by inequality
(5).
The tables given in note 23 infra can be used in a similar manner. In addition,
all the tables can be used to construct hypothetical cases in which the specified ties
occur. To do so, simply choose a line in the appropriate table, assign an arbitrary
value to n, and calculate the resulting values of r and b.
22 It can be demonstrated that:
r b
TR-- ' T-R-+ I-B'
where R' is the number of red directors elected on the first ballot and B' is the
number of blue directors elected on the first ballot. This inequality means that on
the second ballot the red faction can give more votes to each of (R-R') candidates
than the blue faction can give to each of (17 - R + 1 + B') candidates; the red faction
elects R' candidates on the first ballot and at least (R - R') candidates on the second
ballot, for a total of at least R candidates. The proof of this inequality is too long
to be given here. It requires preliminary demonstration that rT = Rn + R', bT =
DUKE LAW JOURNAL
breaking device is used, the inequalities predict accurately the ulti-
mate results; a decision by the blue faction to create a tie cannot
keep the red faction from electing its R directors.
If, however, the directors elected on the first ballot fill the remain-
ing vacancies, the red faction may end up with less than R directors.
When a majority of the directors elected on the first ballot are from
the blue faction, they can name all the rest of the directors. The
red faction is represented only by its candidates elected on the first
ballot. Because this result can occur, the inequalities are inaccurate.
But because it can occur only if the board of directors has thirteen
or more members, and then only in a few instances, the inequalities
can be used safely in most cases.2
CONCLUSION
Generally, Cole's equations describe conditions that are sufficient
but not necessary to their predicted results. For example, if the red
R! B'(T-R + 1)n + B', where n is any integer, and that y-> _1 . From these
propositions the inequality can be derived by algebraic manipulation.
2The instances in which the blue faction has a majority of the directors elected
on the first ballot, for values of T through 21, are:
T R r b R1' B'
13 3 3n -- 2 lln + 7 2 3
16 3 3n + 2 14n + 9 2 4
16 5 5n -- 3 12n + 7 3 4
17 5 5n+2 ln + 5 4 7
17 7 7n--+2 lln+ 3 6 7
18 4 4n -- 3 15n + 11 2 3
18 7 7n + 8 12n + 5 5 6
19 3 3n -- 2 17n + 11 2 5
21 5 5n + 3 17n + 10 3 6
Note that in all of these cases R is less than one-half T; i.e., these results can occur
only when the red faction is a minority.
In other instances each faction elects the same number of directors on the first
ballot. These instances are shown in the following table for values of T through
21:
T . r b R' B'
10 3 3n+~2 8n +5 2 2
12 5 5n - 2 8n + 3 4 4
14 4 4n - 3 lln + 8 2 2
18 5 5n-3 14n + 8 4 4
18 5 5n + 4 14n + 11 2 2
18 8 8n-+3 lln + 4 6 6
20 8 8n + 5 13n + 8 4 4
21 4 4n -- 3 18n + 13 3 3
21 8 8n + 3 14n + 5 7 7
The foregoing data is from the computer study referred to in note 21 supra.
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faction has the number of shares specified by Cole's sixth equation,
it can elect R directors. Cole's error is that R directors may be
elected with fewer shares than his equation indicates are necessary.
This article offers several inequalities that are more accurate than
Cole's equations. One advantage of these inequalities is that they
permit solution of problems involving the voting of fractional shares.
Tied elections can occur in some cases even if one faction votes for
the number of directors that the inequalities indicate it can elect. In
some of those cases that faction may end up with less than the indi-
cated number of directors. This result can occur if the directors
elected on the first ballot fill the remaining vacancies. To this extent
the inequalities are inaccurate. Nevertheless, for most practical
problems they are sufficient.
